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Abstract
The proliferation and extension of unmanned aircraft systems from military to civil and public use applications has rapidly outpaced the
safety analysis that is normally associated with the introduction of a new and novel aircraft. Insights into the types of anomalous events
associated with accidents and incidents involving civil and public use unmanned aircraft systems operating in the National Airspace System
were derived from an information synthesis of archival, publically available reports from the Aviation Safety Information and Analysis
Sharing system. The vast majority of anomalous events were related to equipment failures, primarily lost link, distantly followed by a
variety of non-equipment-related events involving pilot/operator errors, such as near-mid-air collisions, altitude deviations, airspace
violations, and procedural deviations. The identification of types of anomalous events associated with safety reports provided insights for
consideration when developing and implementing mitigation strategies for the design, training, and operation of unmanned aircraft systems.
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Introduction
The proliferation of civil and public use unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) throughout the United States and the rest of
the world has outpaced the safety analysis that is normally associated with the introduction of a new and novel aircraft with
unique operating characteristics and capabilities. In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 140102(a)(41) and 14CFR 11.1, public use
aircraft are those performing noncommercial governmental functions such as national defense, intelligence missions,
firefighting, search-and-rescue, law enforcement, aeronautical research, or biological or geological resource management.
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Unmanned aircraft systems were considered to encompass
all related definitions, including but not limited to unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned aviation systems, small
unmanned aircraft systems, remotely pilot aircraft systems,
remotely operated aircraft, and remotely piloted vehicles,
but not model aircraft used for hobby and recreation, per
Federal Register, 14 CFR Part 91 [Docket No. FAA-20140396] Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft.
Unmanned aircraft systems are currently operated under a
Certificate of Authorization (COA), which include explicit
data reporting provisions for accidents and incidents (FAA,
2014a, 2014b). Pending updates to the current Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAR) that can accommodate
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Section 333 of the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 added provisions
for exemptions and waivers to the FAR through COA’s that
consider size, weight, speed, operational capability,
proximity to airports and populated areas, and operation
within visual line of sight that do not create a hazard to
users of the national airspace system or the public or pose a
threat to national security.
Previous studies of UAS accidents and incidents (Merlin,
2013; Manning, Rash, LeDuc, Noback, & McKeon, 2004;
Tvaryanas & Thompson, 2008; Williams, 2004) relied
primarily on U.S. military data from hostile and nonhostile
operations worldwide. However, the maturation of civil and
public use UAS operations has generated accident and
incident data from hundreds of events in the National
Airspace System (NAS), which demands an analysis to
identify the types of anomalous events so that they can be
considered when developing and implementing mitigation
strategies for the design, training, and operation of
unmanned aircraft systems. A similar study on civil and
public use UAS accidents and incidents was conducted by
Joslin (2015); however, that study only considered reports
from the Federal Aviation Administration preliminary reports
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Accidents and Incidents (FAA
UAS A&I) database. This study expanded on Joslin’s (2015)
study by including reports from the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), Near Mid-Air Collision System
(NMACS), and voluntary reports submitted through the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).
Data Source
The source of information for this study was 327 reports that
were publically available in the Aviation Safety Information
Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) database administered by the
FAA. Although all of the data were extracted from ASIAS in
October 2014, the date range was based on the latest periodic
update cycle for each individual dataset, which varied for each
source. ASIAS provided access to multiple data sources, four
of which had reports of UAS accidents and incidents (Table 1).
These data included 274 reports from the Federal Aviation
Administration Preliminary Reports of Accidents and Incidents
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database (FAA UAS A&I), which became available in
May 2014 and was populated with civil and public use
accidents and incidents in the NAS since April 2010.
Initially, the FAA UAS A&I database was populated
with data starting in October 2009 and included sensitive
events involving Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
public use unmanned aircraft systems. Those data were
subsequently removed from the online database; however,
they were available and included in redacted form for this
study. There were 24 voluntary reports submitted through
the Aviation Safety Reporting System that involved
unmanned aircraft. The ASRS is administered by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
through a memorandum of agreement with the FAA and
was designed to encourage voluntary self-reporting by
pilots of anomalous aviation events, which were then
compiled using a unique ASRS taxonomy (FAA, 2011;
NASA, 2012).
Eleven voluntary reports involving UAS were submitted through the Near Mid-Air Collision System. An
NMAC is defined as an incident associated with the
operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of collision
occurs as a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to
another aircraft, or a report is received from a pilot or a
flight crewmember stating that a collision hazard existed
between two or more aircraft. The NMACS business
rules stated that any studies based on NMAC reports
should consider that the data could be subjective and that
the number of NMAC reports filed did not represent the
total universe of such events.
Furthermore, the submission of an NMAC report can be
influenced by a number of factors. Pilot experience and the
operational airspace in which they operate can influence
reporting. For example, pilots who routinely fly in heavily
used airspace, and are used to flying relatively close to
other aircraft, may be less likely to file a report than a pilot
who usually flies in sparsely populated airspace. The
accuracy of the reporting individual’s perception of an
NMAC can vary considerably among the flight crewmember population. Factors include experience, visibility
conditions, the proximity of aircraft involved, relative
angle of approach, size of the aircraft involved, and the
trauma experienced by the pilot or flight crew.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
accident and incident database had archived 18 events
involving UAS, recorded in compliance with the reporting
requirements under 49 CFR Part 830 1830.5. An unmanned
aircraft accident is defined as an occurrence associated with
the operation of any public or civil unmanned aircraft
system that takes place between the time that the system is
activated with the purpose of flight and the time that the
system is deactivated at the conclusion of its mission, in
which: (1) any person suffers death or serious injury; or
(2) the aircraft has a maximum gross takeoff weight of
300 pounds or greater and sustains substantial damage.
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Table 1
ASIAS sources with UAS accidents and incidents reports as of October 2014.
Database
FAA Accident and Incident Data System (AIDS)
FAA Runway Safety Office-Runway Incursions (RWS)
NTSB Aviation Accident and Incident Data System
FAA Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC)
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
FAA Preliminary Reports of Unmanned Aircraft System
Accidents and Incidents

Date Range

Number of UAS Reports

1978–2014 (30 Sept)
2001–2014 (1 Oct)
1982–2014 (29 Sep)
1987–2014 (12 Oct)
1988–2014 (30 Sep)
2009 (31 Oct)–2014 (21 Aug)

0
0
18*
11
24**
274

*Five of the NTSB reports were also recorded in the FAA UAS A&I.
**One of the ASRS reports was also recorded in the FAA UAS A&I.

There were no UAS-related reports in the FAA Runway
Safety Office-Runway Incursion System (RWS). This is
defined as any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the
incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the
protected area of a surface designated for the landing and
takeoff of aircraft. Additionally, there were no UAS-related
reports in the FAA Accident and Incident Database
(AIDS). The FAA Accident and Incident Data System
database contains data for events that do not meet the
aircraft damage or personal injury thresholds contained in
the NTSB’s definition of an accident.
Methodology
This study informed the ASIAS database by identifying
specific types of UAS anomalous events through an
innovative application of the taxonomy from the Aviation
Safety Reporting System. Each database in ASIAS utilized
a unique taxonomy for types of anomalous events, such as
the FAA UAS A&I database that distinguished five types
(and 40 subtypes) of events (Table 2). However, the ASRS
provided the most comprehensive taxonomy by distinguishing 15 types (and 53 sub-types) of events, thereby
providing the most refinement as to the specific nature of
the events (Table 3).
Simple quantitative frequency counts of each type of
anomalous event were derived by the author through text
mining of the ASIAS report descriptions using the ASRS
taxonomy. Most event types had various subtypes. For
example, an Inflight Encounter event had subtype events
for Near Mid-Air Collision, Controlled Flight Into Terrain,
Loss of Control, Weather/Turbulence, and Visual Flight
Rules in Instrument Meteorological Conditions. Only those
event types and subtypes germane to this study were
presented in the findings.
The ASRS taxonomy was developed for manned aircraft,
which, in some cases, did not directly apply to UAS
operations, such as a Flight Deck/Cabin event. Hence,
anomalous events involving ground infrastructure supporting a UAS control station (e.g., utilities) were considered
Flight Deck/Cabin events, and noncompliance with a
Certificate of Authorization (the authority, issued by the
FAA Air Traffic Organization, needed to operate a UAS in

the National Airspace System as a public aircraft) or pilot/
operator checklist/procedure was considered a Procedural
Deviation type anomalous event.
There was no distinction made between sUAS and UAS,
hence the term UAS applied to both. Small unmanned
aircraft systems, or sUAS, are unmanned aircraft weighing
less than 55 pounds. There also was no distinction made
between types of control stations (e.g., ground, sea, air,
motor vehicle, hand-controller).
Lost link is an interruption or loss of the command and
control link between the control station and aircraft, which
can be the uplink that transmits command instructions to the
aircraft and/or the downlink that transmits navigational,
surveillance, separations assurance/see-and-avoid, and status
of the aircraft. It is also an interruption or loss of the

Table 2
FAA unmanned aircraft accident and incident report form—taxonomy.
Event Type
Deviations from ATC
clearance and/or Letters
of Agreement/Procedures
Lost Control Link Events

Unusual Equipment Malfunctions
(partial list of sub-types)

Aircraft Collisions

All other deviations from the
provisions contained in the
Letter of Authorization and
not encompassed previously
in the report
*Include the magnitude of deviation

Event Subtype
Altitude Increase/decrease*
Assigned Routing Deviation*
Line-of-Sight or
Beyond-Line-of-Sight
Ku Band, C-Band, etc.
Uplink, Downlink or Both
Navigation System Failures
Aborted take-off or landing
due to system failure
Takeoff or landing
damage to airframe
Fires-aircraft or control station
Control station-infrastructure
failure
Other aircraft
Persons
Terrain/water
Wildlife
Other Objects
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Table 3
ASRS types of anomalous events.
Equipmenta

Airspace Violation

Altitude Deviation
Ground Incursion

Speed Deviation
Ground Encounterd

Flt Deck/ Cabinb

ATC Issues
Track/Heading Deviation
Inflight Encountere

Conflict
c

Procedural Deviation
Other

Ground Excursion
Undetermined

Note. (a)-Equipment anomalies were identified as either related or unrelated to a command and control lost link or communications link.
Note. (b)-Flight Deck/Cabin anomalies were redefined as events involving ground infra-structure facilities supporting a UAS control station (e.g. utilities).
Note. (c)-Procedural Deviation included non-compliance with a Flight Clearance or Published Material/Policy (e.g. Certificate of Authorization; Operator’s
Manual).
Note. (d)-Ground Encounter was either a Ground Strike or Object.
Note. (e)-Inflight Encounters were sub-typed as Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT), Loss of Control (LOC), Weather/Turbulence, or Visual Flight Rules
in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (VFR in IMC), Near-Mid-Air-Collisions (NMAC).
(Source: http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov).

communication uplink and/or downlink link between the
control station and air-traffic control. Lost link can be caused
by equipment failures or degradations, pilot error, or an
interruption or anomaly in the uplink/downlink frequency
spectrum, the latter of which is difficult to determine at the
operator level. Hence, lost links of any duration were
attributed to either an equipment type anomalous event or
pilot error, with no distinction made between short duration
lost links, whereby the operation was continued, and those
where the lost link procedures were executed. Lost links
were categorized as either command and control (C2) link,
or communications link.
Findings
Types of Anomalous Events
The most prevalent types of anomalous events were
equipment failures/degradation, which were involved in
231 (73%) of the events, as depicted in Figure 1. Nearly
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Figure 1. Types of anomalous events. Adapted from the Aviation Safety
Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) database using Aviation Safety
Reporting System taxonomy.

half (41%) of the equipment events were related to C2 Lost
Link (Figure 2). Four of the C2 lost links were due to pilot
errors in the execution of link procedures, not equipment
anomalies. There were no reports that cited an issue with
the frequency spectrum as the cause of the lost link.
In addition, there were 14 instances of lost communication
link, where the UAS crew had to rely on telephonic
communication with air-traffic control (ATC). The remaining equipment type anomalous events were related to
failure/degradation of structural, avionics, electrical, or flight
control components.
The top four anomalous events attributed to pilot/
operator error were Near Mid-Air Collisions, Airspace
Violation, Altitude Deviation, and Procedural Deviation
(Figure 1). The Inflight Encounter events consisted of
the following subtypes: Near Mid-Air Collisions; Visual
Flight Rules in Instrument Meteorological Conditions
(VFR in IMC); Loss of Control (LOC), Weather/
Turbulence, and Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT).
There were six ground events where the pilot either made
a hard landing or impacted an object (e.g., runway edge
lights). The two Flight Deck/Cabin-type events were
related to facilities infrastructure, one involving a gas
leak at a nearby support facility that resulted in an
evacuation of the UAS control station, and the other from
a commercial power loss due to a transformer failure,
resulting in a temporary interruption of electrical power
to the UAS control station.
The overall counts for types of anomalous events
exceeded the number of reports, since some ASIAS reports
involved multiple anomalous events (e.g., lost link due to
equipment failure followed by the pilot’s incorrect execution of the procedural checklist to recover the system).
There were no events attributed directly to ATC issues.
However, any occurrences would have been reported
outside of ASIAS through internal FAA requirements such
as the Air Traffic Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR)FAA Form 7210-13, and hence were not available for this
study. The MOR had provisions for reporting any
expression of concern or inquiry by any external entity to
a management official/controller-in-charge (CIC) or to
ATC on the radio concerning the proximity or operation of
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Figure 2. Equipment type anomalous events. Adapted from the Aviation
Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) database.

an aircraft, either airborne or on the surface, including near
mid-air collision notifications from a flight crew (FAA,
2012).
Comparative Findings
There were validity concerns with merging military data
with civil and public use data, due to a variety of known
dissimilar variables (e.g., operating environment, crew
qualifications, equipage, and data frame). In addition, the
military data included operations overseas, as well as the
National Airspace System. However, in the absence of any
recent analysis of substantial historical data for civil and
public use UAS accidents and incidents, it was considered
worthwhile to compare the results without examining the
reasons for agreement or disagreement of the data.
The findings from this study were consistent with
Merlin’s (2013) research that attributed UAS mishaps
primarily to hardware failure, insufficient training, and
deficiencies, and Williams’ (2004) assertion that electrical
and mechanical reliability played as much or more of a role
in UAS accidents as human error. An analysis by Manning
et al. (2004) of 56 US Army UAS accidents for the period
FY95-FY03 indicated that human error was present in
approximately one-third (32%) of the accidents, while this
study indicated that 27% of the accidents and incidents
examined could be attributed to pilot/operator error issues.
All of the historical literature agreed with this study that
equipment failures have been the most common type of
anomalous event.

This study improved on the utility of the Aviation Safety
Information and Analysis Sharing system databases to
enhance aviation safety by identifying the most prevalent
types of anomalous events associated with civil and public
use unmanned aircraft system operations. The vast majority
of the events were related to equipment failures, specifically
command and control lost link, distantly followed by a
variety of non-equipment related events involving pilot/
operator errors. Near Mid-Air Collision was the most
frequent non-equipment error followed by airspace violation,
altitude deviations, and procedural deviations. The study
also revealed considerations unique to unmanned operations,
which were anomalous events from degradation of facilities
infrastructure that support UAS control stations, and the
reliance on a telephonic system as a back-up communication
link with air-traffic control. The practical application of the
findings may be used when developing and implementing
mitigation strategies for the design, training, and operation of
civil and public use unmanned aircraft systems.
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